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Abstract 
In Part 1 of this paper, I introduce the idea of interactional expertise while in Part 2, I focus 
on its implications for philosophical theories of the importance of the body in forming our 
conceptual world.  I argue that the way philosophers have dealt with the body turns attention 
away from the most important questions and that we cannot answer these questions without 
making the notion of socialisation, and therefore interactional expertise, a central concept in 
our thinking.  This makes language at least as important, and often more important than 
bodily practice in our understanding of the world.  The notion of a disembodied socialised 
agent leads in the direction of interesting questions while the notion of an embodied but 
unsocialised human actor is unimaginable. 
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Part I: Interactional Expertise 
The philosophical idea of interactional expertise first arose before the term was invented.  
This was in the mid-1990s, in the context of the discussion of the limitations of artificial 
intelligence (AI); the question was can machines without human-like bodies be intelligent?1  
The first published appearance of the term ‘interactional expertise’ (IE) was in the ‘Third 
Wave’ paper by Collins and Evans, published in 2002 but this paper dealt with the concept 
‘by-the-way’ while attempting to shift social scientists’ attention to expertise in general.  The 
first full discussion of the term is found in a 2004(a) paper entitled ‘Interactional Expertise as 
a Third Kind of Knowledge’ which draws together the AI stream of thinking, fieldwork 
observations and an analysis of language.  In all, four channels feed into the idea of 
interactional expertise, as shown in Table 1.  The backbone of the concept is the 
philosophical stream.  The 2004a article unites the philosophy stream with the fieldwork 
‘tributary’ and an imitation game ‘tributary’.  There is also a ‘sociology and policy’ channel 
which, on pain of some convoluted hydraulics, is mostly downstream from the others in a 
sideways kind of way. 2   
  
                                                 
1 Collins 1996a, the original source, was a review of Hubert Dreyfus’s What Computers Still Can’t Do. 
2 This Figure, and much of Part 1, is adapted from Collins and Evans 2015 which deals with each of the entries 
in much greater detail than here.     
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The sociological interpretation of Wittgenstein 
The basic ideas that led to the concept of interactional expertise can be dated to the 
interpretation of Wittgenstein that gave rise to the sociology of scientific knowledge (as 
represented in the full-width black box at the head of Table 1).  In our case, the start was a 
reading of Winch’s (1958/1988) The Idea of a Social Science – a book which presents itself 
as a philosophical critique of sociology. The reading of Winch with which we started, ‘stands 
Winch on his head’ or, at least, ‘on his side’.  What is treated as crucial is Winch’s argument 
that social and conceptual life are two sides of the same coin but the reading draws out the 
sociological implications of the idea instead of presenting it as a philosophical critique.  In so 
far as a critique can be drawn from Winch’s argument, philosophy is as much sociology as 
sociology is philosophy.  This reading gives rise to what we will call ‘the sociological 
interpretation Wittgenstein’ and the consequent use of the work of the later Wittgenstein is 
similar to that recommended by Bloor.3  This interpretation of Wittgenstein has been 
accepted by only a minority of philosophers but has proved fruitful in the sociology of 
scientific knowledge and other domains.   The Winch-inspired sociological interpretation of 
Wittgenstein has given the diverse streams of the idea of interactional expertise a unity 
though the streams were not brought together in print, until 2004.   
The separation principle  
The sociological interpretation of Wittgenstein treats ‘forms-of-life’ in a Durkheimian way 
such that a social group’s patterns of language and practice give rise to their understanding of 
                                                 
3 The position finds its most explicit formulation in David Bloor’s (1983) argument that the later (e.g. 
1953/1958) Wittgenstein is to be thought of as a sociologist as much as a philosopher.  See also Bloor 
(1976/1991) 
the world.  You cannot understand peoples’ actions without understanding their concepts and 
you cannot understand their concepts without understanding their actions.  Around page 120 
of his little book, Winch explains this in terms of the hygiene-related actions of surgeons in 
an operating theatre and their integral dependency on the idea of ‘germ’.  Inter alia he invents 
the notion of scientific paradigm revolution four years before Kuhn’s ‘Structure  ...’ which 
was published in 1962.4  The new thought that gives rise to interactional expertise is that the 
contribution to a form-of-life of language on the one hand, and practice on the other, can be 
analytically and empirically separated – this is what we are now calling the ‘separation 
principle’.  Under this model, language and practice together give rise to forms-of-life at the 
collective level but individuals can acquire a complete ‘understanding’ of a form-of-life 
through immersion in the language alone and without taking part in the practices.  The 
principle, then, separates collectivities of humans from individuals; language and practice are 
inseparable at the collective level while separable at the individual level.5  The formulation 
below, upon which I cannot improve, is taken from the 1996(a) publication referred to above:  
Wittgenstein said that if a lion could speak we would not understand it.  The reason 
we would not understand it is that the world of a talking lion - its `form of life' - 
would be different from ours.  Bringing back Dreyfus's chair example, lions would 
not have chairs in their language in the way we do because lions' knees do not bend as 
ours do, nor do lions `write, go to conferences or give lectures'.  ... But this does not 
                                                 
4 It gives rise to a very natural sociological/philosophical interpretation of the Kuhnian notion of paradigm 
(Kuhn 1962) 
5 For my own claim about why bodies are important at the collective level such that we cannot envisage a 
society of brains in vats or one mediated solely by electronic media without face-to-face contact, see Collins, 
1996b.  This argument, however, does not mean that we could not individual brains in vats which were 
connected into society.  To show that is not possible, if it is not, requires a more difficult kind of argument and 
one can see how difficult it is going to be by noting the success of contemporary AI device which are plugged 
into society via Google-type internet connections..  
mean that every entity that can recognise a chair has to be able to sit on one.  That 
confuses the capabilities of an individual with the form of life of the social group in 
which that individual is embedded.  Entities that can recognise chairs have only to 
share the form of life of those who can sit down.  We would not understand what a 
talking lion said to us, not because it had a lion-like body, but because the large 
majority of its friends and acquaintances had lion-like bodies and lion-like interests.  
In principle, if one could find a lion cub that had the potential to have conversations, 
one could bring it up in human society to speak about chairs as we do in spite of its 
funny legs.  It would learn to recognise chairs as it learned to speak our language.  
This is how the Madeleine case is to be understood; Madeleine has undergone 
linguistic socialization. [Madeleine is a woman, discussed by Oliver Sacks 
(1985/2011), who was almost totally disabled from birth yet, according to Sacks, was 
completely fluent in spoken language.] In sum, the shape of the bodies of the 
members of a social collectivity and the situations in which they find themselves give 
rise to their form of life.  Collectivities whose members have different bodies and 
encounter different situations develop different forms of life.  But given the capacity 
for linguistic socialisation, an individual can come to share a form of life without 
having a body or the experience of physical situations which correspond to that form 
of life.   
I found myself reviewing this book because of my work on AI which developed from the 
mid-1980s.  In this work I end up challenging Dreyfus’s well-known claim that computers 
cannot act ‘intelligently’ because they do not have bodies.6  My counter-claim is that 
                                                 
6 The first foray is found at the end of Chapter 1 of my 1985/1992 and it was followed by a prize-winning paper 
at the annual meeting of the British Computer Society Specialist Group on Expert Systems which in turn 
encouraged me to write my 1990.  I knew nothing of Bert Dreyfus’s work when I started this.  If I had I 
computers are not intelligent, not because they don’t have bodies but because we do not know 
how to embed them in society.  The example of Madeleine was put forward by AI-pioneer, 
Douglas Lenat, one of Dreyfus’s critics, in order to show that one can learn language without 
having a human-like body and Collins agreed with Lenat on this point while still holding that 
computers cannot be intelligent because they cannot be socialised.   The term ‘interactional 
expertise’ was not used in these early contributions but the idea that language and practice 
must be separated if we are to be clear about the different relationship of the collectivity and 
the individual to a form-of-life is the key and fully expressed in the quoted passage.  The idea 
depends on the additional idea, worked out more carefully in the 2004a publication, that 
language is not formal, ‘propositional knowledge’, as it is treated by those keen to stress the 
practice element of forms-of-life, but is itself a tacit knowledge-laden form of social 
interaction. 
Philosophically, interactional expertise as it first appeared makes a new claim about how 
forms-of-life work and how individuals fit into them: mostly people in a society come to 
understand each other through socialisation that involves sharing both practices and language 
but sometimes this understanding is via acquisition of the spoken language alone.  It is argued 
that only this way can we understand, for example, how those who are sufficiently 
congenitally challenged to be unable to engage in common practices with others can come to 
participate in the common society by immersion in the spoken discourse alone.   
                                                 
probably would not have started because his work is so terrifyingly good but, as it is, I took a different and much 
more sociological line. 
A bold conjecture: The strong interactional hypothesis 
The last entry in the philosophy stream in Table 1 is the ‘strong interactional hypothesis’ 
(SIH).  It takes forward the idea of interactional expertise in the form of, to use Popper’s 
(1959/2002) term, a ‘bold conjecture’:  
In principle, the level of fluency in the language of a domain that can be attained by 
someone who is an interactional expert only is indistinguishable from that which can 
be attained by a full-blown contributory expert in any test involving language alone 
(e.g. Collins and Evans 2007:31) 
The SIH stresses the philosophical nature of the concept: under the right circumstances an 
individual can fully understand the world through the medium of language alone.  As a bold 
conjecture, the SIH may be wrong.  The initial empirical foundation for it is Sacks’s account 
of ‘Madeleine’ (see above) and this is not a reliable source because Sacks had a different 
purpose in mind.  The SIH is meant to unsettle thinking and encourage more experiments and 
observations – pressing thought and experiment to its limits is the job of a bold conjecture.   
The fieldwork tributary 
The fieldwork tributary arose out of Collins’s deep immersion, beginning the mid-1990s, in 
the society of gravitational wave physicists.  Towards the end of the 1990s he noticed that his 
interactions with his respondents involved lots of physics talk of the technical kind which 
physicists had with each other.  He called this ability to talk physics without doing it, 
‘interactional expertise’.  Both streams of thinking are related to the separation principle.  In 
the first stream this is exemplified by the situation of the congenitally disabled who cannot 
practice; in the second stream it is exemplified by the sociological fieldworker immersed in a 
technical domain who does not practice.   
The imitation game tributary 
The imitation game (IG) tributary also arises out of AI.  Two chapters of Collins, 1990 
discuss the protocol of the Turing Test, arguing that it is a test of cultural embedding, not 
intelligence: 
A Turing-type test is a good test for computing ability precisely because it is a test of 
the extent to which a machine can be located in an interactional network without 
strain.  Instead of asking about the innate ability of the machine one looks at its 
interactive competence; this is how we judge other things that interact with us.  ... 
[they] fit neatly into our socio-cognitive networks (Collins 1990:190). [The other 
things being referred to are humans.] 
Imitation Games are Turing Test with humans.7  First experiments intended to explore the 
notion of interactional expertise were carried out on the colour blind and persons with perfect 
pitch (Collins and Evans 2014).  We then tested Collins’s – and various others’ – ability to 
pass as gravitational wave physicists (Giles 2006).  We then went on to test those who had 
been blind from a very early age.  In each case, just as one would expect, the persons who has 
spent most time in embedded in the discourse of the other group were best at pretending to be 
that group: colour-blind person were better at pretending to be colour-perceivers than colour-
perceivers were at pretending to be colour-blind; in contrast, ‘pitch-perceivers’ (those with 
perfect pitch) were better at pretending to be ‘pitch-blind’ (the rest of us) than the pitch-blind 
were at pretending to be pitch-perceivers; and, most strikingly of all, by a ratio of around 
85/15, the blind were better at pretending to be sighted than the sighted were at pretending to 
                                                 
7 The Turing Test (Turing 1950) was, of course, based on an parlour game in which men pretended to be women 
and vice-versa 
be blind.  After this, following Evans’s use of the game in his sociology lectures to look at 
straights and gays and Christians and non-Christians, we were awarded a large grant to look 
at such topics cross-nationally (Collins and Evans 2014).8  The imitation game continues to 
be used by various groups on a large and small scale to look at many different kinds of 
cultural difference. 
To repeat, the mainstream and the tributaries all originate from the sociological interpretation 
of Wittgenstein and that is why they all fit together.  The philosophical stream disaggregates 
forms-of-life into practice and language components; the fieldwork tributary arises out of the 
focus of attention on the extent to which the analyst has acquired the native form-of-life; the 
imitation game tributary is to do with seeing the Turing Test as a measure of how well an 
individual (or computer) is embedded in a form-of-life. 
The sociology and policy stream 
Some wider implications of the idea of interactional expertise are shown in the sociology and 
policy column of Table 1.  From the top, the idea illuminates the extent to which non-experts, 
such as political activists concerned with scientific and technological developments, can 
acquire enough understanding of the science and technology to make a sound contribution to 
debates (see also Collins 2014 and Collins and Evans 2015 and Collins, Evans and Weinel, 
2016, forthcoming).  The second entry refers to a thought experiment in Collins, 2004a, 
which tries to work out the technical ‘rights’ of a (special) interactional expert in case it 
should be discovered that gravitational waves were dangerous to health.9  The following 
                                                 
8 The grant is an Advanced Research Grant awarded by the European Research Council (#269463, IMGAME, 
2011-2016,  €2,26M) 
9 The concept of ‘special interactional expert’ (Collins, 2011), arises consequent on realisation that contributory 
experts are interactional experts too so the ‘special’ has to be added to indicate that the expert has no 
contributory expertise.  
entries refer to the realisation that interactional expertise is the main resource of managers of 
technical projects (see Collins and Sanders, 2007) and that it is also the main resource of peer 
reviewers, and the members of technical committees where it can be observed that 
calculations and experiments are not done though the results of calculations and experiments 
are discussed.  The next entry – ‘sports coaches etc’ we will return to since it marks a clear 
difference with the approach of Dreyfus which is relevant to the second part of this paper on 
embodiment.  The next two entries (special IE has already been mentioned in footnote 8), 
concern interactional expertise and interdisciplinary collaboration – so-called ‘trading zones’ 
(Collins et al 2007).   The following two entries indicate the potentially much more extensive 
reach of the concept of interactional expertise; it is claimed that without it we cannot 
understand how technical specialists coordinate their actions since they cannot all practice 
each other’s actions and that therefore we cannot understand complex division of labour 
without the concept.  Finally, the concept may be needed to explain the workings of society 
as a whole where, say, men and women are, perforce, unable to undertake certain of each 
other’s practices yet must understand these mutually unpractised practices well enough to 
work together (or not!).  The final entry refers to our attempt to use the concept as the basis 
for a suggestion for a new kind of committee (The Owls) which, in disputed areas, would 
reach and grade the best currently available technical understanding and feed it to policy-
makers.   
The above is a brief sketch of the notion of the sources of interactional expertise and its 
applications.  The force of the idea should become still clearer in the following part of the 
paper which deals with its relationship to the philosophical analysis of embodiment. 
Part 2: The body and language 
Where we agree 
The first thing to say is that in relationship to the traditional ‘artificial intelligentsia’ and their 
hype I am in complete agreement with Bert Dreyfus and in pretty good agreement with his 
critique of what he calls ‘Good Old Fashioned AI’ (GOFAI).  GOFAI is based on the idea 
that, to use Minsky’s term,  we are just ‘meat machines’; when we do a calculation we are 
doing with our brains what a pocket calculator does with its program and silicon chips; when 
we execute a physical movement such as hitting a ball with a bat, we are somehow using our 
senses to create a description of the position and movement of things in space and time and 
our brains are doing physics calculations that can generate instructions to our muscles that 
will move our body parts such that the bat will hit the ball.  Both Dreyfus’s phenomenology 
and an extrapolation from the Wittgensteinian/Winchian (W/W) starting point lead to the 
same position in respect of this notion: it is ridiculous.  In the case of W/W it is ridiculous 
because of the rules regress: rules do not contain the rules for their own application so any 
attempt to build a system that runs on rules of this kind is going to need further rules to know 
how to apply them and the problem is where those further rules come from.  Dreyfus made all 
this clear at least as early as 1967 in his ‘Why computers must have bodies in order to be 
intelligent’ and with what he called the ‘framing’ problem and I got there about twenty years 
later from a somewhat different starting point.  Dreyfus, of course, is ‘the man’, and 
deservedly so, while I am an interloper in respect of this debate, but the differences between 
us has become more and more marked and, I think, is now quite interesting and productive.   
Where we disagree 
The bottom line of our disagreement is that Dreyfus thinks that the crucial thing is the body 
while I think that the crucial thing is embedding in society.  Once more, the position is quoted 
most clearly in an abstract of a paper: 
[N]o machine will pass a well-designed Turing Test unless we find some means of 
embedding it in lived social life. We have no idea how to do this but my argument, 
and all our evidence, suggests that it will not be a necessary condition that the 
machine have more than a minimal body. Exactly how minimal is still being worked 
out. (Collins, 2008, p. 309, stress added for current purposes) 
Later in this paper I am going to worry about whether my claim that we have no idea how to 
embed a computer in society is as secure as it once was.   
The paper quoted above is the last in a short but flourishing argument between me, putting 
forward that the idea of interactional expertise against the idea of embodiment and the 
embodiment position put forward by Dreyfus and his supporters.10  Unfortunately, in the way 
of so much academic life, this debate flared up and died without either party shifting their 
position.  While I am inclined to think that is because the other parties were not prepared to 
admit that I was right even though they must know it ‘in their heart of hearts’ there are two 
other possibilities: we are talking across each other and my arguments are too obscure to 
understand.  Here I’ll have another go at trying to eliminate those possibilities.   
                                                 
10 Notably Evan Selinger. The argument which can be dated from the 1996a review, continued in 
Collins’s contribution to Dreyfus’s Festschrift under the terms ‘social embodiment thesis; 
‘individual embodiment thesis’ and ‘minimal embodiment thesis’ (Collins 2000) and further 
published discussions followed in, for example, Selinger (2003), Selinger and Mix, (2004), 
Collins (2004c), Selinger, Dreyfus and Collins (2007), Selinger, 2008 and Collins, 2008.  
Very roughly, the philosophers (Dreyfus and Selinger) argued that the crucial point was that 
Madeleine had a body with a sense of front, back and so forth and that is why Lenat was 
wrong; the sociologist (Collins), argued that the interesting thing was the fluency that 
Madeleine could achieve with only a ‘minimal body’. 
The asocial body in general 
I am not a well enough trained philosopher to engage with Dreyfus et al on their home 
ground.  Thus the apogee of the embodiment idea is said by Bert Dreyfus to be Samuel 
Todes’s 1960s PhD thesis published in 2001 as Body and World, but I find that book very 
difficult because of the way it sets itself within the philosophical canon not to mention its 
scholarly density, which is typical of a PhD.11     
What is clear, however, even from my lowly position, is that Todes is concerned with the role 
of our bodies in our experience of the world.  Thus our horizontal orientation is conditioned 
by the fact that we have a front which favours movement forward, eyes pointing forward and 
so on, and a much less accessible back, and the fact that ‘our bodily self-movement is itself 
grounded in the vertical field of gravitation’ (pxiv of the Introductory remarks by Piotr 
Hoffman).  But Todes remarks: ‘The reader is forewarned that the analyses presented in this 
study are not of our normal experience in its full complexity  ... Thus, for example, for the 
purposes of this study of the human body as the material subject of the world, our experience 
is simplified by disregarding our experience of other human beings.’ (p1, author’s stress).  
Since I am very much an autodidact in this area, and in a many other areas of philosophy, I 
am relieved to find an online review of the book which also points out. 
But the book bypasses entirely the fundamental human experiences of sociality and 
language—instead one could read Todes thinking that humans are hermits working 
out the meaning and efficacy of their participation in the world. The kinds of insights 
later hermeneuts and constructionists offer—that the categories we use to make our 
                                                 
11 Dreyfus mentions the importance of Todes as far back as his 1967 and reiterated his view of the central 
importance of Todes’s book at the meeting where this paper was first presented; his favourable views are still 
clearer in his published introductory remarks to Todes’s book.  
experience know-able and habit-able are accessible human and cultural 
constructions—were not available to Todes (Tom Strong, ‘Bodies and Thinking 
Motion’, Janus Head, 7(2), 516-522. Copyright © 2004 by Trivium Publications, 
Amherst, NY.  Accessed last on 15 December 2015 at http://www.janushead.org/7-
2/Todes.pdf)  
Todes explains that he assumes that his experience of the material world is the same as that of 
every other human: ‘I make the commonsense assumption that I live in the same world with 
you, my reader; and that your body plays the same role, philosophically speaking, in your life 
as mine does in my life.’ (p1)  Todes goes on to say that he hopes to complete a second study 
of humans’ relationships with other humans – this, however, was never to be completed and 
Todes died in 1994. 
Thus, by the time we are only a couple of pages into Todes’s book we can see that we are 
probably talking across each other since I am simply unable to imagine how one can deal 
with perception and conceptualisation without seeing the major component as having to do 
with living in a social world: as having to do with socialisation and differential socialisation.  
The method of Todes is phenomenological – that is, it is an analysis of human experience – 
and from this develops a theory of the way humans in general interact with the material 
world.  I have nothing against this project nor do I have grounds to argue against it.  I am 
happy to accept what is said about humans in general – but I am not acquainted with any 
‘humans in general’ only humans who see the world in specific and varying ways consequent 
upon the societies in which they live.12     
                                                 
12 Another source is the sociology of knowledge given a Wittgensteinian interpretation. 
One of the marked differences between Dreyfus and I is, then, that I start with social beings 
and he does not.  Furthermore, it is only possible for him to erect Todes to the status of hero 
(and I think the same goes for erecting Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger to hero status), by 
ignoring the social dimension of our engagement with the world.  And this all makes sense 
chronologically because, as the reviewer quoted above remarks: ‘The kinds of insights later 
hermeneuts and constructionists offer—that the categories we use to make our experience 
know-able and habit-able are cultural constructions—were not available’ to any of them.   
[Let me now put something in parenthesis.]  Only with the growth of the sociology of 
scientific knowledge (SSK) in the early/mid1970s did the full extent of the social influence 
on perception become clear.  When even science and mathematics, the last redoubt of the 
asocial, turned out to be creatures of their social setting, then the reach of a universal theory 
of human perception narrowed still further.  Looking back with this in mind I think I finally 
understand a long-past incident.  In November 1991 Dreyfus was kind enough to contribute 
to an ‘author meets critics’ session at the annual meeting of the Society for Social Studies of 
Science held, that year, in Cornell University.  Dreyfus criticised my newly published (1990) 
book, Artificial Experts: Social Knowledge and Intelligent Machines which I thought of, 
somewhat fearfully, as no more than a sociologised version of his 1972 book.  My fear was 
that Dreyfus would say there was nothing new in my book and I did think that his 1972 was 
so well done that I would find such a charge hard to answer.13  In fact he took the opposite 
approach, treating my book as sufficiently different to be well worth attacking, which 
relieved me mightily. What took me by surprise, however, was his vehement criticism of my 
                                                 
13 His remarks and my response were published as: Hubert Dreyfus, 'Response to Collins, 
Artificial Experts', Social Studies of Science, Vol. 22, No. 4 (November 1992), 717-26; 
Collins, H. M., (1992) `Hubert Dreyfus, Forms of Life, and a Simple Test For Machine 
Intelligence', Social Studies of Science, 22, 726-39 
SSK-style social constructivism, which seemed to me at the time not particularly important in 
respect of the discussion of computers.  The attack was aimed at the way I tried to explain 
why some domains could be computerised and some could not – a matter of whether or not 
we chose to digitise our social life (restrict ourselves to machine-like or mimeomorphic 
actions) in respect of a domain.14  But at last I see that an asocial conception of the world is 
central to a Todes/Dreyfus style of phenomenological analysis, or even a Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty style, so making everything social, as I was doing, would be anathema.  [End 
of parenthesis.]      
Todes, to repeat, puts forward a general theory of humans’ interaction with the world.  What 
implications that can be drawn from a theory of humans in general?  The implications ‘on the 
table’ – those we find ourselves arguing about – are the possibilities and limitations of 
artificial intelligence and the capacities of specific individuals with unusual bodies and the 
source of the abilities of specific groups of skilled individuals.  Let me try to explain what I 
see as the problem with the aid of an analogy.  Linguists, such as Chomsky and his academic 
supporters and rivals, try to develop theories of language.  That is, they try to explain the 
basic features of language and they study the ways humans acquire language.  If one accepts 
what they say – let us suppose one is convinced by Chomsky’s arguments for the existence of 
a universal transformational grammar – one then knows something about the limits and 
possibilities of human language in general.  But this understanding provides only limited help 
if the topic one is interested in the language speaking abilities of feral children or the 
development of French, or German, or Swahili.  If unusual bodies/brains or natural languages 
are the problems then generative grammar does not help very much.  In the same way, 
                                                 
14 The term machine-like actions is taken from the 1990 book and is contrasted with the rather weak ‘regular 
actions’ but in our 1998 book Kusch and I change the terms to mimeomophic and polimorphic actions.  
general theories such as that of Todes, can’t help much when it comes to the skills of 
particular groups, such as tennis-players or surgeons, nor when it comes to the particular way 
individuals such as the blind and the deaf cope with the world.  In fact the contrary is the 
case: in so far as one might think that the general theory had something to say about the blind 
it seems to be wrong; surely we would expect individual blind persons, for whom the 
difference between front and back is much less marked than it is for the sighted, to live in a 
different world, and yet they do not.   
Well, I say they do not and yet we can find a suggestion that they do in H. G. Wells’s short 
story, written in 1904, ‘The Country of the Blind’.  This, I suggest, is a brilliant exercise, 
avant la lettre, in the phenomenological analysis of the body.  Wells indicates that a society 
made up of the blind would live in a different world.  Thus, in a country of the blind there 
would be far less distinction between inside and outside and between day and night because 
neither walls nor darkness would present an obstacle to ordinary perception, now working 
through the ears rather than the eyes.  I would imagine that the difference between front and 
back would also be less marked.  In Well’s country of the blind everything is different 
because of this differential embodiment.  But the Country of the Blind is a whole different 
society illustrating how the body, language and the world interact at the collective level.  
What is strking is that in the societies of the sighted which we inhabit, the blind as individuals 
seem pretty similar to the rest of us in the way their world is constituted so a Todes-like 
theory actually leads us in the wrong direction.  And that is because Todes, and presumably 
everyone who bases their work on his ideas, cannot see the difference between how things 
work at the collective and individual level and fail to cope with the fact that the body is, at 
best, far less important when it belongs to an individual.      
Talking across each other 
In casual conversations with Bert we often have a little exchange that goes something like 
this: 
Bert: You say you can come to understand a practical ability by immersion in the 
spoken discourse.  Do you think that just by talking about it you can learn to become a 
surgeon? 
Harry: Of course not, I would no more say that than I would say that you can teach 
someone to ride a bike by talk alone. 
Bert: Then we have no disagreement. 
I think that these little snatches of conversation involve our talking across each other and the 
locus of mutual misunderstanding is the word ‘understand’.15  I think Bert is taking as an 
implicit definition of ‘understanding a practice’ the ability to execute that practice.16  I am 
taking as an explicit definition of ‘understanding’, being able to pass a maximally demanding 
Turing Test or, rather, Imitation Game, in which the person who understands cannot be 
distinguished from a contributory expert – one who does know how to practice – in a verbal 
test.  As I have tried to explain in Part 1 of the paper, this is not a trivial criterion, it is not just 
                                                 
15 For snatches of a general theory of how different communities talk across each other, see Collins and Reber 
2013.  Reber is the leading psychologist of ‘implicit learning’; we exchanged around 600 emails trying to work 
out why a psychologist and a sociologist, on the face of it working on the same topic, have never felt the need to 
cite each other’s work. 
16 This was actually the definition of understanding that I used in my very first (1974) published paper in which 
I showed that TEA-laser scientists could learn to build a laser only if they acquired the tacit knowledge and this 
involved social contact with successful TEA-laser builders.  The key to my discovery was rejecting the models 
of information exchange implicit in the literature on information diffusion -- which were all about what people 
read and how they came to read what they read – and replacing them with a stronger criterion – people had not 
to be able to read but to do – actually build a working TEA-laser – before I counted them as being possessors of 
TEA-Laser building knowledge.  Bert is working with this criterion whereas for the purpose of what is going on 
here I have shifted to another criterion.    
‘talking the talk’ without being able to ‘walk the walk’ because in a maximally demanding 
Imitation Game the interrogator will ask questions that bear on practical understanding such 
as ‘How does it feel when you are first learning to balance on your bike?’ and ‘What does it 
feel like at the moment you know you are going to fall off?’   
We are, of course, in the world of thought experiment here because it is unlikely that anyone 
who has not ridden has ever been sufficiently immersed in the discourse of bike-riding to be 
able to answer those questions – indeed such a deep discourse may not exist – but, under the 
bold conjecture – the ‘strong interactional hypothesis’ – the discourse would exist and the 
person immersed in it would be able to answer the questions.  Does that mean that the person 
who has been so immersed in the discourse knows how it feels to first learn to balance and to 
fall off?  Does it mean that sufficient immersion in the discourse means that the person has 
experienced the same ‘feels’ (the philosophical term is ‘qualia’ I believe) as the person who 
has actually learned to ride and actually fallen off?  I would say that ‘no’ is the answer.  But 
nevertheless the person with sufficient interactional expertise can make all the same 
judgments about the practical expertise in question as the person who has actually 
experienced the ‘feels’ and you would not be able to tell who is who by asking them 
questions.  And that is why interactional expertise can do the work for technical managers 
who have to make those judgments and can do the work for all of us where we have to 
interact with others in respect of experiences of theirs that we have not shared – and that is 
nearly all the time.  And that is why human societies are so different to animal societies and 
that is why a Todes-like analysis that does not give language an absolutely crucial position is 
not going to get us where we need to get to if we want to understand human understanding.   
The disagreement is, then, stark.  Bert says: 
You may have mastered the way surgeons talk to each other but you don’t understand 
surgery unless you can tell thousands of different cuts from each other and judge 
which is appropriate. In the domain of surgery no matter how well we can pass the 
word along we are just dumb. So is the sportscaster who can’t tell a strike from a ball 
until the umpire has announced it.  
I think the upshot of this is that Harry has discovered a new way of showing 
how the Turing Test fails to test intelligence and also fails to test linguistic expertise. 
He has shown that just being able to pass the word along is an inauthentic use of 
language. (Selinger et al, 2007 p 737) 
In fact Bert even goes on to say, fairly desperately as I see it, that since I do seem to 
understand GW physics without doing it:  
Gravitational wave physics may be an interesting exception. Science in general is 
desituated but even science normally requires skilled discriminations. (Selinger et al, 
2007 p 737, stress added)   
Note that as late as 2007 when this was published, Bert was still sticking to the idea that 
science is desituated, still refusing to recognise the much richer understanding of science we 
have had since the 1970s. 
Models of language and the limits of interactional expertise 
Wondering if the root of the problem is different notions of language, in Table 2 I try to set 
out what I think is going on in as clear a way as possible.  As I see it, Bert and his colleagues 
live in a world where row 2 is beyond conception or too dangerous to be countenanced. 
 Table 2: Are different conceptions of language at the heart of the problem? 
Let me be clear about what I do not want to claim for interactional expertise, that is, for 
special interactional expertise.  Since we now believe that the relationship between 
contributory expertise and interactional expertise is transitive so that all experts are at least 
latent interactional experts (except, perhaps, for the exceptional cases in the first member of 
the list below) the question devolves into the capacities or interactional experts who are not 
contributory experts.  Note that not all latent interactional experts become full-blown 
interactional experts: a latent interactional expert may not be able to realise their interactional 
 THE ACTIVITY 
ASSOCIATED MODEL OF 
LANGUAGE 
1 Practical ability (contributory expert) 
No language involved: ‘walking the 
walk’ 
2 
Special interactional expertise which 
involves an understanding of practical 
ability to the point of being able to make 
sound practical judgments even if does 
not carry the bodily sensations associated 
with it.  In principle an interactional 
expert is indistinguishable from a  
contributory expert in a Turing Test 
Language is a practice which is 
tacit-knowledge laden and technical 
judgment depends on tacit 
knowledge that can be captured by 
language.  This is ‘walking the talk’. 
3 Formal or technical knowledge 
Language, when used carefully, is a 
set of propositions like theorems 
which can express some of the rules 
contained in formal representations 
of physical processes which are 
found in scientists’ abstractions and 
may by usable in computerised 
‘micro-worlds’. 
This is using talk as an abstraction 
4 ‘Passing the word along’ 
Language used in this way is a 
tricky and misleading attempt to 
pretend to have real practical 
understanding: it’s just ‘talking the 
talk not walking the walk’ 
expertise if they do not have interactional or reflective ability (ie they are inarticulate).17  
We’ll use a list of questions for absolute clarity: 
1) Is it possible, in principle, to pass a Turing Test/Imitation Game in respect of every 
possible practical action?  My inclination is to say ‘no’.  There are sensations that are so 
surprising in their intensity that I think no amount of speaking about them could put a 
person in position to make the right judgments in respect of them without having 
experienced them.  For example, I cannot imagine that talk could ever reproduce the 
condition for the experience of (a) the rare intense sexual desire for an individual 
associated with either love or infatuation and (b) the witnessing of the birth of one’s own 
child and the early years of parenthood.  The astonishing intensity of these experiences is, 
in each case, a thing that I cannot imagine being imaginatively reconstructed.  If language 
is not enough then anything that approaches interactional expertise would not be enough.  
(The case of soldiers’ experience of battle is discussed in Collins 2012.) 
2) These few exceptions apart, are there special interactional experts in respect of all 
practical accomplishments?  Here the answer is definitely ‘no’ because to become an 
interactional expert requires that (a) there is a well-developed body of language – a 
‘practice language’ – corresponding to the practical activity and (b) the speakers of the 
practice language are willing to absorb into their community someone who does not take 
part in their practices.  There are probably lots of cases where condition ‘a’ is not fulfilled 
and the extent to which it is fulfilled for ordinary activities will vary from society to 
society.  The same kind of variation will apply to condition ‘b’ and here matters are 
complicated by secrecy and time constraints. 
                                                 
17 This is worked out in Collins and Evans 2007. 
3) Is interactional expertise always maximal?  The trouble here is that one does not know 
what maximal interaction expertise means.  Maximal interactional expertise belongs more 
to the bold conjecture than the real world.  In the real world we are almost always dealing 
with less than maximal interactional expertise – certainly in the case of special 
interactional experts – and we mostly don’t know how complete a case we are dealing 
with.  But this is not fatal.  It is certainly important to keep in mind that acquiring 
interactional expertise is a difficult and generally long-drawn-out matter and important 
that it does not become a ‘lite’ concept justifying any activist’s opinion on anything about 
which they know a little.18  But none of this makes interactional expertise any harder to 
deal with than any other expertise – we are always having to make judgments about how 
expert someone is, sometimes employing tests but mostly not – while the idea of 
interactional expertise, and the idea of the imitation game, and the bold conjecture, keep 
our thinking on the right lines.  Interactional expertise has important practical 
implications but it is also important not to let practical difficulties cloud the difference it 
makes to the relative importance of the language and body as compared to the 
phenomenological approaches discussed here.   
Main differences and the narrow gaze of the embodiment thesis  
Let us finish by summing up some of the differences just mentioned or implied. 
1) Collective and Individual and general and particular: The influence on understanding of 
the body and of specific bodily activities, such as playing various sports, surgery and 
specialties within science and technology, has to be treated separately at the collective 
                                                 
18 For a discussion of ‘lite’ concepts and how to put a ‘floor’ under interactional expertise see Collins and Evans 
2015. 
and individual levels.  At the collective level a Dreyfus analysis is correct: the form and 
content of our practical abilities and understanding has much to do with the form of our 
bodies: the general limits are probably set by a Todes-like analysis of forward-backward, 
vertical, within gravity and so forth, but this applies only at the highest level – it applies 
to human beings in general.  Nested within this highest level are questions about 
particular activities in which some humans engage and others do not.  The particular 
forms are worked out by a more Heidegger/Merleau-Ponty inspired Dreyfus-like analysis 
of the way we interact with the material world.  But the Dreyfus-like analysis of 
individual’s understanding of these collective practical activities is wrong because 
individuals who have not practised those collective practices, either because they cannot – 
the disabled – or have not – non-tennis-players or non-participants in GW physics – can 
still understand those practices through being immersed deeply enough in the 
corresponding practice languages.  If we do not accept this we cannot understand how the 
world works: we cannot understand how sports commentators and coaches who are not 
themselves top-level ex-players commentate well and coach well; (Dreyfus says they 
must always do it badly but he is obviously wrong); we cannot understand how managers 
manage in technical domains nor can we understand peer review or the workings of 
technical committees; we cannot understand complex division of labour; and we cannot 
understand how the societies we live in could possibly work.     
2) What is the body? Since we see that the wheelchair bound and the blind are not struck 
dumb by their disabilities but seem to speak much as we do a question arises as to what 
the famous body consists of?  We have two models on the table.  The phenomenological 
model in which humans can extrapolate in some mysterious way even if they have bits of 
their body removed but, unfortunately, no one seems interested in how much can be 
removed before extrapolation becomes impossible.  Why not?  The interactional expertise 
model takes it that the minimal body is requires only enough components to enable it to 
engage in deep linguistic discourse.  I used to think these components would include ears, 
larynx etc, but I now see that with prostheses (think of Steven Hawking) the minimal 
body must be pretty close to a ‘brain in a vat’ so long as it is well enough connected to 
society.  What is clear, is that the brain must be capable of handling natural language: that 
now seems to me to be the only requirement so long as we set aside what it means to be 
connected into society.  
3) Where an understanding of interactional expertise leads:  The intensely disappointing 
thing about the view of humans that does not take account of linguistic socialisation is the 
extreme narrowing of the range of questions asked.  Take language into account and as 
we have begun to see, a whole new set of inquiries are opened up.   
a. Why can’t animals, which have bodies that are in most respects similar to us 
and live in the same gravitational field, communicate with each other in a rich 
way?  The foxhound knows nothing of the Chihuahua, the lion nothing of the 
domestic cat. 
b. Why are feral children unable to learn language? 
c. Why do the deaf find it so difficult to acquire a high level of linguistic skill 
unless they are taught language in some special way from birth? 
d. As already mentioned, why are the blind, as opposed to the deaf, so fluent? 
e. As already mentioned, why are the congenitally physically disabled so fluent? 
f. As already mentioned, how come we can understand things in respect of 
which we do not exercise our bodies? 
All these things seem to need answers to do with language and the brain: the gross 
body is a constant in a, b and, c where linguistic ability and understanding is markedly 
different to the norm while it varies in d and e, and its use varies in f, and fluency and 
understanding are unchanged or in the case of f, hardly changed if other 
circumstances are right.  Here we are using a classic scientific research method – 
holding the body constant while watching understandings change and changing the 
body while watching understanding remain the same!  In the normal way only one 
conclusion would follow: the body cannot the crucial causal factor when it comes to 
understanding – not at the individual level, anyway. 
The really frustrating thing is that these questions, which one would think would be burningly 
central to anyone who was interested in the role of the body in understanding, are simply 
ignored by the embodiment theorists. 
Computers, socialization and the internet 
Let us return to the big question with which both Dreyfus’s critique of AI and the idea of 
interactional expertise began – the view that computers need bodies to be intelligent and the 
counter-view that they can manage without bodies but they cannot manage without 
socialisation.  It is hard to go forward on the embodiment side of this because we do not 
really know what a body consists of, Selinger drifting toward my position in saying it can be 
a minimal thing with minimal properties.19   
But my social-embedding position is not as secure as I once thought it was either.  I said in 
2008 that we have no idea how to socialise a machine.  The trouble is that a lot has changed 
since the 1990s, when this idea was first worked out.  I expressed my 1990s understanding in 
a critique of the Chinese Room thought experiment.  I argued that even if the Chinese Room 
worked as advertised it would represent only a frozen moment of lived language.  Language, 
                                                 
19 See his contribution to Selinger at al 2007. 
being the property of the community, is always changing, so even if the Chinese Room could 
work as advertised for a day or two its way of using language would soon become archaic 
unless its look-up tables were continually refreshed by persons who were immersed in the 
changing flux of lived language.  I argued that the intelligence would lie with the persons 
refreshing the tables, not the tables; the Chinese Room was like an extremely complicated 
telephone mediating normal conversation, not via converting sound waves into electrical 
signals and back again, but via a complicated trick with paper and print.  We do not think 
telephones are intelligent so we should not think the Chinese Room is intelligent – the 
intelligence lies with two lots of ordinarily socialised native speakers: there are the speakers 
downstream of the conversation asking the questions and there are the speakers upstream of 
the conversation continually feeding-in updated look-up tables.20   
Now, the problem for me as a critic of AI is that we now have automated ways of continually 
updating the look-up tables – something that I did not foresee a decade or so back!  What has 
happened is that at today’s frontiers of AI computers are continually connected with the 
internet!  Furthermore, these computers that are continually connected to the internet are 
much more successful than any previous form of AI.  Google is something like a working 
Chinese Room because it does not provide a fixed set of questions and answers but a 
continually updated set, the updates being based on what members of the embedding society 
are currently interested in – this is how Google’s ‘page-rank’ works.  It draws on the 
intelligence of the community of internet users.  Other successful programs – that is programs 
that are more successful than those of a few decades back – also draw on the internet.  As I 
                                                 
20 A useful place to see this argument set out is the aforementioned Collins and Reber, 2013  
understand it, these programs include IBMs ‘Watson’ and voice-interaction programs such as 
‘Siri’.   
On the one hand, I could count this as a triumph for my theory: ‘I said that AI isn’t going to 
work unless they build socialised computers and the new generation of “socialised” 
computers work much better than anything we have seen before so I was right.’  On the other 
hand, I don’t really believe this is proper socialisation – socialisation is far more mysterious 
than that.  So that is the next job: work out the difference between Google and true 
socialisation.  I am betting, that for all the reasons set out above, it won’t have anything to do 
with fronts, backs and gravity.   
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